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The Influence of Income Tax
Rules on Insurance Reserves
David F. Bradford and Kyle D. Logue

One of the most important components of the balance sheet of a propertycasualty insurance company is the loss reserve. In spite of what the term may
suggest, a loss reserve is not a pot of funds set aside for the uncertain future.
It is an accounting entry, a liability on the balance sheet. More precisely termed
the unpaid-losses account, the loss reserve expresses the amount the company
expects to pay out in the future to cover indemnity payments that will come
due on policies already written for losses that have already been incurred and
to cover the costs of dealing with the associated claims. The latter category of
costs, which includes, for example, the litigation costs associated with settling
claims, is called loss-adjustment expenses. 1
If loss reserves were determined solely on the basis of pure insuranceaccounting theory, they would reflect only those factors that affect the size,
frequency, and pattern of future claim payments and loss-adjustment expenses.
Such factors would include changes in patterns of actual claim payments;
changes in inflation rates, weather patterns, and technology; and, particularly
David E Bradford is professor of economics and public affairs at Princeton University, a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research, and adjunct professor of law at
New York University. Kyle D. Logue is professor of law at the University of Michigan.
During his work on the paper, Bradford enjoyed the hospitality of the Center of Economic
Studies at the University of Munich and helpful discussions there with Michael Reiter, Christian
Thimann and Richard Arnott. Logue's work on this project benefited from numerous conversations
with his colleagues at the University of Michigan Law School. He gives special thanks to Jeffrey
Lehman, who provided both useful substantive suggestions and wise counsel throughout this project. He also thanks Stuart Thiel for several helpful discussions. In addition, helpful comments and
suggestions were received from David Cummins, James Hines, Sean Mooney, Ralph Winter, and
Mark Wolfson. James Bohn was helpful on matters of aggregation. Ryan Edwards and Ning Zhang
provided exceptionally able research assistance. Financial support was provided by the Woodrow
Wilson School, Princeton University, and the NBER Project on the Financing of Property/Casualty
Risks. The usual caveats apply.
1. Our discussion of insurance accounting and solvency regulation draws primarily from Mooney and Cohen (1991), Salzmann (1974), Peterson (1981), and Troxel and Bouchie (1990).
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significant in the context of liability insurance, trends in tort doctrines and jury
awards. In practice, however, loss reserves are influenced by other considerations as well, considerations such as how the reported reserves will affect the
likelihood of regulatory scrutiny, the perceptions of investors, and the firm's
income tax liability. In this paper, we begin to examine the effects of income
tax rules on property-casualty reserving practices.
Although insurers can choose from a number of different approaches to calculating their loss reserves, all these approaches share some common characteristics. The insurer generally begins by collecting information about its own
loss experience as well as information about the rest of the industry's loss experience. With respect to the latter, industrywide data are collected and distributed to insurers through rating bureaus such as the Insurance Services Organization. These data include information about the severity, frequency, and
timing of past claim payments and claim-expense payments as well as information about changes in trends and patterns of payments.
Once these data have been collected, the insurer's actuarial department applies various statistical techniques designed to generate predictions about the
insurer's future loss claim payments and loss expenses. Typically, the actuarial
department will recommend a range of loss reserves. Then, from within this
range, someone in management (e.g., the chief financial officer) will choose
the actual number that will be reported on the insurer's books. In any event,
the choice of the reported loss reserve inevitably rests with management, and
it is undisputed that management has some measure of discretion in setting
those reserves (Peterson 1981).
In thinking about the role played by reserves as liabilities in the financial,
regulatory, and tax accounting of the insurance company, it is useful to keep in
mind the generic connection between a balance sheet and an income statement.
In general terms, income, a flow concept, equals the sum of the increase in an
associated stock concept, which is net worth, and amounts distributed to the
company's owners during a given period. And net worth is the excess of a
company's total assets over its total liabilities at a given time. For reporting
purposes, the flow concept (income) is recorded on the income statement, and
the stock concept (net worth) is recorded on the balance sheet. Thus, in theory,
a company's reported income for a given period is simply the increase in the
company's net worth during the period. (If there is a distribution to owners
during the period, this statement is modified in an obvious way.) As for the
specialized case of insurance accounting, the concept of net worth is called
surplus, and it is reported on the insurer's year-end balance sheet as the difference between total assets and total liabilities. Likewise, net changes in surplus are reflected on the insurer's income statement as an operating gain or
loss.
This is where an insurer's loss reserves come into the picture. Loss reserves
are typically the largest single liability on an insurer's balance sheet. Therefore,
owing to their sheer magnitude, even relatively small percentage changes in
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loss reserves can significantly affect an insurer's surplus (i.e., the company's
stock picture) and its operating results or income (i.e., the company's flow picture).
State insurance regulators specify the accounting conventions that insurance
companies must use in the reports that they file for purposes of regulatory
oversight. Collectively, these conventions are known as annual statement or
statutory accounting. Statutory accounting has traditionally required-and, in
most states, still requires-that loss reserves be reported on an undiscounted
basis, both on the balance sheet and on the income statement. That is, despite
the fact that an insurer's loss reserves represent the insurer's expected future
claim payments and loss expenses, which one might expect to be discounted
to a present-value equivalent, statutory accounting requires the insurer to calculate the balance-sheet entry using the simple sum of those future outlays.
In addition, until 1986, insurers were required to use statutory accountingincluding undiscounted loss-reserve calculations-for the purpose of calculating their federal income tax liability. As part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986
(TRA86), however, insurers were required to discount their loss reserves for
federal tax purposes. The details and the importance of this change are discussed below.
In the modern view of the firm, managers are modeled as making managerial
decisions that serve their own interests. These interests will coincide with the
interests of the firm's owners if the managers are appropriately socialized or if
appropriately structured compensation schemes are in place (Fama 1980; Jensen and Meckling 1976). The management of an insurance company has an
interest in the results reported on the company's balance sheet and income
statement. Additionally, with respect to some elements of the balance sheet
and income statement, management has considerable discretion. That is, for
such accounting elements, the information that is available to management regarding the company's performance and financial position does not translate
automatically into accounting data that can be reported. For these elements,
the exercise of managerial judgment is not only feasible but necessary. The
insurer's loss reserve is one such accounting variable, the setting of which can
be understood as a managerial decision.
In addition to playing an essential role in determining the insurer's annual
financial and tax-accounting income, loss reserves are used in measuring an
insurer's overall financial strength. All else equal, including a fixed and positive
relation between reported loss reserves and a "best estimate" of future payment
liabilities, a larger loss reserve is associated with an increased risk of the insurer's insolvency. If this risk becomes sufficiently large, state insurance regulators may increase their level of surveillance or intervene in some way. State
regulators monitor specifically the insurer's ratio of surplus to premiums written. If this ratio falls below a given threshold, the regulator will require that
steps be taken by the company to improve its financial position. In the extreme
case, if the insurer is on the brink of insolvency, the regulator may take over
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the company and run it. For obvious reasons, the financial condition of the
insurer is also important to investors and to policyholders. In fact, from the
point of view of insurance-company management, perhaps the most important
consumer for the company's accounting data is the commercial rating agencies,
such as A. M. Best and Standard & Poor's, whose ratings regarding a company's financial condition can be critical to the company's future prospects.
In sum, because loss reserves play an important role in determining insurers'
reported income and surplus, one would expect management's reserving discretion to be affected by all the external factors mentioned above.
The exercise of discretion in reporting reserves has been studied by a number of previous researchers. Within this literature, perhaps the most commonly
tested question is the extent to which insurers deliberately manipulate loss reserves to "smooth" (i.e., to reduce the variability in) earnings over time (see,
e.g., Forbes 1970; Balcarek 1975; Ansley 1979, and Harrington 1988). This
question was studied, for example, by Smith (1980) and Weiss (1985) in the
context of automobile-liability lines of insurance. Both concluded that their
findings were consistent with the smoothing hypothesis; both also suggested
other possible causes of the reserving errors observed in their data, for example, unanticipated inflation. Grace ( 1990) carried out a similar study of lossreserving errors. Grace hypothesized that management would choose loss reserves that maximize the company's discounted after-tax cash flow subject to
smoothing constraints and uncertainty. Looking at automobile-liability lines
from the period between 1966 and 1979, Grace, too, concluded that the results
of her study were largely consistent with her hypothesis. More recently, Petroni
( 1992) explored the hypothesis that the incentive to underestimate loss reserves
is a decreasing function of the financial strength of the insurer. The results of
this study suggest that insurance companies that are close to receiving regulatory scrutiny tend to understate their reserves by a larger amount than other
insurance companies.
Our interest in loss-reserving practices began with our realization that major
changes in the federal income tax laws enacted in 1986 altered dramatically
(although temporarily) the loss-reserving incentives of property-casualty insurers. Specifically, TRA86 changed the tax treatment of property-casualty insurance companies in ways that greatly increased the tax advantage of"conservative" loss reserving during the transition period from the pre-TRA86 world
to the post-TRA86 world. (Conservative loss reserving is the reporting of loss
reserves that fall systematically on the high end of the distribution of possible
outcomes.) Thus, we were interested in exploring empirically how responsive
insurers' loss-reserving discretion is to tax incentives.
Our study of the effect of taxes on loss reserving can be located within two
established lines of inquiry. First, in the accounting literature, several researchers have attempted to determine the extent to which. external incentives affect
management's use of its accounting discretion in reporting earnings. For example, important contributions to the study of income management include
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White (1970), Dascher and Malcolm (1970), Koch (1981), Lambert (1984),
Moses (1987), McNichols and Wilson (1988), and Scholes, Wilson, and Wolfson (1990). Second, our research contributes to the study of the effect of tax
law and tax-law changes on business decisions more generally. For a sampling
of the enormous literature on this subject, see Slernrod (1992), which includes
a collection of empirical studies of the effects of TRA86 on various types of
business decisions.
Section 7 .1 describes the relevant tax-law history and sketches out some of
our hypotheses concerning reserving behavior. Section 7 .2 gives some descriptive statistics on the industry. Section 7.3 develops a quantitative measure of
the tax incentives bearing on the reserving decision. Section 7.4 looks at the
time-series evidence in industrywide data. There is a brief concluding section.

7.1

Income Tax Treatment of Property-Casualty Insurance Companies

The tax treatment of property-casualty insurance companies is governed by
a special set of rules that are found in subchapter L of the Internal Revenue
Code. Under these rules, property-casualty insurers are required to calculate
their taxable income using essentially the same accounting conventions required by state insurance regulators, referred to, as we have noted, as statutory
or annual statement accounting. The statutory approach requires an insurer to
calculate its annual income by taking into account both its net underwriting
profit (or loss) and its net investment income (or loss) for the year. To determine
its underwriting profit or loss, the insurer starts with the premiums accruing
during the year and then takes a number of deductions, the largest of which is
typically the increase in the insurer's incurred losses account, which, in turn,
includes any increases in unpaid loss reserves. Note also that annual statement
accounting requires insurers to treat loss-reserve increases and loss-reserve decreases symmetrically. Thus, if an insurer has a net decrease in its loss reserves
during the course of the year, the insurer must include the amount of that decrease in its underwriting profits for the year. (An increase in the estimated
total of losses incurred and loss-adjustment expenses for policies that were
written before the current reporting year is known as a reserve strengthening.
A downward adjustment in those estimates is known as a reserve weakening
or release.
Given the availability of the loss-reserve deduction for federal income tax
purposes, an insurer will often have a tax incentive to overstate its loss reserves.
This is because overstating the reserve will increase the deduction and reduce
the insurer's taxable income for the year. To be sure, that reduction comes at
the cost of an equal increase in a future year's taxable income; nevertheless, in
the meantime, the insurer will have benefited from the time value of the excess
deduction. (As we explain below, owing to the transition provisions ofTRA86,
there was an extra advantage for reserves in 1986 and 1987 and possibly for
reserves in earlier years as well.) Of course, tax effects are not the only source
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of incentives operating on the reserving decision. In some years, for example,
management may have an interest in understating the insurer's loss reserves so
as to boost reported financial earnings. In addition, any tendency to overstate
reserves will be constrained to some extent by the threat of increased scrutiny
by state regulators or by the Internal Revenue Service. (If a loss-reserve deduction is unreasonably large, the unreasonable amount of the deduction can be
disallowed by the IRS [Treas. Reg. sec. l.832-4(b)].)
TRA86 contained at least three provisions that should have significantly affected management's incentives with respect to loss reserving: First, TRA86
enacted the largest reduction in corporate income tax rates ever. Under the act,
the corporate rate was scheduled to decline from 46 percent in 1986, to 40
percent in 1987, and, finally, to 34 percent in 1988. Second, TRA86 introduced
the requirement that, in calculating loss-reserve deductions and inclusions for
federal income tax purposes, insurers must discount loss reserves to present
value. 2 Third, TRA86 included a special "fresh-start" transitional rule that applied to pre-1987 loss reserves, under which insurers were permitted to write
down their end-of-1986 reserves to the discounted amount. Reserve increases
due to strengthening in 1986 of pre-1986 reserves were, however, not eligible
for the fresh start.
The opportunities that were created by the tax rate changes to reduce effective tax burdens are straightforward. Overstating loss reserves (i.e., reporting
"conservative" reserves) is a method of postponing taxable income. Thus, any
dollar of taxable income that was postponed from 1986 to 1987 or from 1987
to 1988 would have generated $.06 in tax savings (not including the usual benefit of deferral).
The fresh-start rule enacted in conjunction with the discounting requirement
also created possibilities for reducing taxes by adjusting reserves. Under the
fresh-start provisions, insurers could take loss-reserve deductions in pre-1987
tax years at their undiscounted value, while the corresponding inclusions in
income in post-1987 tax years were on a discounted basis. The net effect was
to provide a second deduction (deferred in time to a degree depending on the
length of the payout tail on the line in question) for the difference between the
discounted and the undiscounted total of reserves carried into the new regime
on 1 January 1987. (The length of the tail of an insurance policy is the span of
time from issue until all payments have been made.) Congress recognized that
the fresh-start provision would give insurers an incentive to exercise their lossreserving discretion so as to increase the amount of their loss reserves eligible
for the fresh start. That is why the law expressly disallowed the application of
2. The discount rate and loss-payment pattern that insurers must use in discounting their reserves
are promulgated by the Treasury Department. Under certain circumstances, an insurer may elect
to use its own historical loss-payment pattern. TRA86 also contained several other changes that
specifically altered the tax treatment of property-casualty insurers. For a discussion of some of
these changes and an investigation of their effects on insurers' investment strategies, see Cummins
and Grace (1992).
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the fresh-start rule to reserve strengthening that occurred in the 1986 tax and
reporting year. (For most insurers, the concepts tax year and reporting year
coincide.) Under this rule, to the extent that an insurer increased its loss reserves in the 1986 tax year in a way that was deemed to be a reserve strengthening by the IRS, the insurer would in effect be required to treat that reserve
strengthening as if it had been made in 1987, under the new discounting rules.
To be more precise, the insurer would be permitted to deduct the undiscounted
value of the reserve strengthening in the 1986 tax year, but it would also be
required to return the amount of the discount into income in the 1987 tax year
(Treas. Reg. l.846-3[e]). Thus, insurers could increase the amount qualifying
for the fresh-start advantage by increasing reported reserves on new policies
written in 1986 and by increasing reserves on all other policies in 1985 or
earlier. For example, if an insurer overstated its loss reserves in the 1986 tax
year for policies written in 1986 and corrected the overstatement in some post1986 reporting year, the initial loss-reserve deduction would have been taken
at the larger, undiscounted value, and the later loss-reserve inclusion (resulting
from the corresponding weakening of the overstated reserve) would have occurred at the smaller, discounted value. The fresh-start rule implied a similar
incentive to overstate loss reserves in pre-1986 tax years, to the extent that
companies anticipated the enactment of the discounting requirement. 3

7.2 The Industry: Descriptive Statistics
The lines of insurance that are offered by property-casualty insurance companies can be described in a number of different ways. For the purposes of this
paper, we use the five lines set out in table 7.1, which are the categories that
were used by the industry before 1989.
3. The requirement that property-casualty loss reserves be discounted for federal income tax
purposes was first proposed in June 1983 in a hearing before the Senate Finance Committee. The
proposal was put forward both by the Treasury Department (see Chapoton 1983) and by the General Accounting Office (see Mavens 1983). Comments on the proposal were received at the same
hearing from members of the insurance industry, including representatives of the American Insurance Association, the National Association of Independent Insurers, and the Alliance of American
Insurers and representatives of a number of large insurance companies. The discounting requirement appeared then in 1984 as part of the 'Ireasury Department's report to the president ("Treasury
I''; see U.S. 'Ireasury Department 1984). Subsequently, in President Reagan's 1985 tax-reform
proposal ("Treasury II"; see U.S. Treasury Department 1985), a proposal was included that would
have had the same effect as the discounting requirement proposed by the 'Ireasury Department and
by the General Accounting Office. Earlier in 1985, the GAO had published its report calling for,
among other changes, the introduction of the discounting requirement (see U.S. General Accounting Office 1985). Finally, a provision quite similar to the Treasury Department and GAO proposals
was enacted as part of TRA86. The proposal to reduce the top marginal corporate income tax rate
from 46 percent ultimately to 33 percent also appeared in both 'Ireasury I and Treasury II.
In related research, Logue (1996) examines the extent to which, in the period leading up to
TRA86, the news of these two tax-reform proposals-the discounting requirement and the reduction in corporate tax rates-may have affected insurers' loss-reserving decisions and, in turn, the
pricing and availability of some lines of insurance. This period roughly corresponded in time with
the so-called liability-insurance crisis of the mid- l 980s.
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Table 7.1
MI
AL
WC
OL
MM

Line Abbreviations
"Miscellaneous": farmowner's, homeowner's, and commercial multiple
peril, ocean marine, aircraft (all perils), and boiler and machinery
Automobile liability
Workers' compensation
Other liability
Medical malpractice

Note: In the pre-1989 statements, data for these lines were reported in the following parts of
Schedule P: IA (automobile liability), 1B (other liability), IC (medical malpractice), ID (workers'
compensation), and IE (farmowner's multiple peril, homeowner's multiple peril, commercial multiple peril, ocean marine, aircraft [all perils], and boiler and machinery) (our "miscellaneous" line).
After I 988, the same lines were reported as follows: lA (homeowner's/farmowner's), 1B (private
passenger automobile liability/medical), IC (commercial automobile/truck liability/medical), 1D
(workers' compensation), IE (commercial multiple peril), IF (medical malpractice), lG (special
liability [ocean marine, aircraft (all perils), boiler and machinery]), IH (other liability). To put the
later data in the same categories as the earlier data, lines 1B (privage passenger automobile liability/medical) and IC (commercial automobile/truck liability/medical) of the 1989 form were added
together to match the pre-1989 line IA (automobile liability). Lines lA (homeowner's/farmowner's), IE (commercial multiple peril), and IG (special liability [ocean marine, aircraft (all perils),
and boiler and machinery]) from 1989 were added together to match the pre-1989 line IE (farmowner's multiple peril, homeowner's multiple peril, commercial multiple peril, ocean marine, aircraft [all perils), and boiler and machinery). The remaining lines of insurance (workers' compensation, medical malpractice, and other liability) were the same for both years, differing only by part
designation within the schedule. Before 1989, the part designations were 1B (other liability), IC
(medical malpractice), and ID (workers' compensation). In 1989, the designations were ID (workers' compensation), IF (medical malpractice), and lH (other liability).

The lines are arranged in order of length of tail. Thus, the shortest-tailed line
is the category miscellaneous, and the longest-tailed line is the category medical malpractice. We have used these line designations to organize the descriptive statistics in table 7 .2, which is meant to provide a general picture of the
total property-casualty market, specifically, of how much of the overall market
is represented by each line of insurance.
Another way of illustrating the differing tail lengths, and the actual pattern
of loss payments, for various lines is to use loss profiles. In table 7.3, we provide the standard loss profiles, for all five lines, that have been promulgated by
the Treasury Department to be used in computing discounted loss reserves, as
required by TRA86. The columns show, for each line, the assumed percentage
of the incurred losses (and loss expenses) that have been paid by the end of the
year specified in the row, relative to the accident year. The figures in boldface
type indicate the years in which the year-to-year change in paid losses exceeds
4 percent of the total. Thus, table 7.3 displays clearly the different lengths of
tails of the five lines. Table 7.4 shows the implied average time to payout for
each line.
Table 7 .5 shows the "loss ratios" for the industry, by line by accident year.
The loss ratio is simply the ratio of incurred losses (including loss-adjustment
expense) to earned premiums. Because of the deferral of payout under the
long-tailed lines, one would expect their equilibrium loss ratios to be higher

Table 7.2

Line

MI
AL
WC

OL
MM
Total

Property and Casualty Insurance, Aggregate Statistics for 1993 (amounts reported in thousands)
Premiums
Earned
(RY 1993)

% Distribution
of Premiums

Total Losses and Loss
Expenses Incurred
(AY 1993 reported in 1993)

Ratio of Losses
to Premiums

Unpaid Loss
Reserves for All
Accident Years

% Distribution
of Reserves

41,502,943
69,735,926
30,311,809
17,018,772
4,278,988
162,848,438

25
43
19
10
3
100

33,299,942
62,136,202
24,733,279
14,104,169
5,316,464
139,590,056

80
89
82
83
124
86

36,522,008
83,733,227
67,077,085
53,819,285
19,560,549
260,712,154

14
32
26
21
8
100

Source: Authors' calculations based on Best's Aggregates and Averoges (various years).
Note: RY = reporting year. AY = accident year.
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Table 7.3

Treasury-Specified Loss Profiles, 1988, by Line
MI

AY +
AY+
AY +
AY +
AY +
AY +
AY +
AY +
AY +
AY +
AY +
AY +
AY +
AY +
AY +
AY +

0
I
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

56
79
86
91
94
97
98
98
99
99
99
100
100
100
100
100

AU

WC

OL

34

26
55

9
25

68

40
55

65
80
89
94
97
98
98
99
99
99
100
100
100
100
100

76
80
84
85
87
89
89
90
91
91
92
92
100

66
75
80
84
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
100

MM
3
13
23

36
45
54
61
67
72
75
78
81
83
86
89
100

Source: Treasury Department regulations. Table extended beyond AY + IO according to Treasury
rule of thumb and truncated at AY + 15.
Note: Figures given in boldface type indicate the years in which the year-to-year change in paid
losses exceeds 4 percent of the total. AY = accident year.

Table 7.4

Average Time to Payout, by Line
Line

Average Time to Payout (years)

MI
AU
WW
OL
MM

1.2
1.6
3.1
4.4
6.3

Source: Authors' calculations on data from Bests Aggregates and Averages ( 1988).

than those of the short-tailed lines. 4 (The reference in the table to the "post1988" lines relates to the way the statistics are presented in the annual reports;
the aggregation of policies used in this table differs from the standard described in table 7 .1 in that automobile liability is split into two lines, private
passenger and commercial automobile.)
We should point out that there is an element of apples and oranges in table
7.5. For the earlier accident years and especially the shorter-tailed lines in
those years, the loss ratios are effectively the final result. That is, the loss ratios
can be understood to be no longer an estimate or prediction of future loss pay4. For an extended discussion of the determinants of equilibrium premiums, see Bradford and
Logue (1998).
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Accident
Year
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994

The Influence of Income Tax Rules on Insurance Reserves

Loss Ratios by Accident Year (using post-1988 lines of insurance)
Homeowner's/
Farmowner's
(Ml)

.76
.69
.75
.76
.74
.79
.67
.65
.68
.83
.78
.86
1.24
.83
.89

Private
Passenger

Commercial
Automobile

Workers'
Compensation
(WC)

Other
Liability
(OL)

Medical
Malpractice

.78
.83
.85

.84
.91
.97
1.09
1.20
1.04
.79
.75
.79
.84
.81
.80
.80
.83
.84

.72
.73
.82
.93
1.07
1.04
.95
.91
.93
.94
.93
.89
.86
.82
.80

.83
.99
1.21
1.45
1.66
1.22
.64
.56
.62
.70
.75
.78
.80
.83
.84

1.47
1.68
1.70
1.71
1.47
1.21
.81
.72
.75
.82
.98
1.13
1.21
1.24
1.23

.88

.95
.97
.92
.91
.91
.93
.92
.87
.88
.90
.90

(MM)

Source: Best's Aggregates and Averages (various years).

outs over premiums earned but rather an accounting of past payouts over premiums earned. For the later accident years, however, especially the longertailed lines in those years, the loss ratios continue to have a substantial element
of uncertainty; thus, those ratios continue to be, to a substantial extent, in the
nature of forecasts.

7.3 Tax Incentives Bearing on Reserves
As discussed above, when an insurance company writes a policy, it acquires,
in addition to a right to receive a premium payment or series of such payments,
an obligation to make a stream of future loss payments (dependent on contingencies). For the purpose of computing its annual underwriting income, the
insurer starts with premiums accrued during the year. From this amount is deducted the amount of accrued premiums not yet earned (because they are for
coverage to be provided in the next year); these accrued premiums are added
to the "unearned premium reserve account," and to this amount is added the
amount of premiums accrued in the past but earned in the current year, which
premiums are subtracted from the unearned-premium-reserve account. (The
details of the treatment of the unearned-premium-reserve account in the derivation of taxable income were changed by TRA86. For a discussion, see Bradford and Logue [1998].) The net result is the "earned-premium" income. The
second major step in determining underwriting income for a given reporting
period is the deduction for "losses incurred" during the period. This deduction
consists of two parts: a deduction for the losses that were actually paid during
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the period and a deduction for the increase in the unpaid-losses account (i.e.,
the loss reserves). (Recall that the loss reserves are the losses that the company
has reason to believe have been incurred but have not yet been paid.)
With the passage of time, that is, as the insurer moves from one reporting
year to the next, the insurer accumulates information about the policies that it
has written in each accident year. As indemnity payments are made under those
policies, the insurer shifts losses from the "unpaid" to the "paid" accounts. In
addition, the insurer updates its estimates of total losses incurred under those
policies. These two changes are implemented in the accounts by a combination
of a deduction for the losses paid during the year and a deduction for any
increase in loss reserves during the year. The latter is simply the difference
between the end-of-current-reporting-year reserve and the end-of-previousreporting-year reserve.
To see how this works, consider the case in which, in the current reporting
year, there is no change in the estimate of the total losses incurred for a given
past accident year-call it "accident year X." In such a case, the unpaid loss
account (loss reserves) will be reduced by the amount of loss expense paid
during the year. Therefore, the deduction for losses paid during the current
reporting year with respect to accident year X will be exactly offset by a negative deduction for the change in reserves. Because the end-of-currentreporting-year reserve for accident year X will be lower than the end-ofprevious-reporting-year reserve for that accident year by exactly the amount of
losses paid during the year, accident year X will have no underwriting-income
consequences for the current reporting year.
Now consider the case in which, in the current reporting year, there is a
change in the estimated total loss incurred with respect to a past accident
year-again, call it accident year X. Such a change will result in a further
change in the end-of-current-reporting-year loss reserve for that accident year,
that is, a change in addition to the normal reduction in that reserve to account
for paid losses. The point can be put more generally. If, in the current reporting
year, an insurer increases its estimate of total incurred losses for a given accident year (i.e., the insurer strengthens that accident-year reserve), there will be
a corresponding deduction from income in that reporting year in precisely the
amount of the strengthening, holding all else constant. The flip side is also
true. If the insurer reduces its estimate of total incurred losses for a given accident year (a reserve weakening), there will be a corresponding inclusion in
income for that reporting year.
Thus, the sequence of deductions and inclusions in income that must be
made by an insurer with respect to the loss side of any insurance policy is
identical to the sequence of adjustments to the losses-incurred account for that
policy-which, recall, represents the estimated total loss (paid and unpaid)
with respect to that policy. Of course, the first time that the losses incurred for
a given accident year in a given line show up in the insurer's accounts is at the
end of the accident year. That would be the only year in which the accident
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year and the reporting year overlap. After that, any net deduction or inclusion
in a given reporting year with respect to a given accident year would be the
result of a revision in the total incurred losses for that accident year. If there is
a fixed point in this sequence of adjustments, it would be when enough time
has passed so that all liabilities with respect to an accident line and year are
finally settled and the final losses-incurred number is known. Working back
from that point, any variation in the incurred-loss estimate at the end of the
previous reporting year results in offsetting changes in the income in the two
adjoining reporting years.
So, whether intentional or not, an overstatement of total incurred losses at
the end of the next-to-last reporting year results in a deduction from that year's
income that is balanced by an equal extra indusion in income in the last reporting year. This is the mechanical result of the income calculation: deduction
of the sum oflosses paid during the year and the excess of the end-of-year loss
reserve (zero in the last year) over the end-of-previous-year loss reserve. The
same reasoning applies as one works back from year to year. A decision to
overstate loss reserves by one dollar in one year implies-other things, including future loss reserves, equal-a reduction in this year's income by a dollar
and the addition of a dollar to the following year's income.
To this point in the analysis, we have assumed that loss reserves are not
discounted to present value. In the case of discounted reserves, the analysis is
slightly different. In this case, a one-dollar overstatement of reserves in one
reporting year produces an extra deduction of less than a dollar in that year,
namely, the discounted value of the future payment implied by the addition to
total estimated payouts. 5 Consequently, adding a dollar to the total incurredloss estimate in a year results in a deduction from income in that year of some
amount less than a dollar. As in the undiscounted case, however, a reduction in
this year's income by a dollar implies-other things, including future loss reserves, equal-the addition of a dollar to the following year's income. The
deferral effect of overstatement is the same, but the deferral per dollar of overstatement is reduced, relative to the undiscounted case.
The tax and accounting-income consequences of the choice of stated reserves in a given reporting year can thus be fully summarized by the implications for the income calculations in that year and in the next year. To determine
the tax incentive to add a dollar to the incurred-loss estimate in a year, we
therefore need to know the tax rate applicable in the adjacent years as well as
an estimate of the discount rate applied by companies to variation in the cash
flow due to changes in the tax liabilities in the adjacent years.
The incentive bearing on the reserving decision depends on the company's
anticipation of future tax rates. The rate applicable to a given company will
5. The factor by which undiscounted reserves are multiplied to get discounted reserves depends
on the profile of remaining payments to be made under a policy. It will tend to be larger the later
in the life of a policy. However, if the payment profile is "humped," the factor applicable to a given
line and accident year could actually decline from one year to the next.

The Financing of Catastrophe Risk, edited by Kenneth A. Froot, University of Chicago Press, 1999. ProQuest Ebook Central,
http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/umichigan/detail.action?docID=408529.
Created from umichigan on 2022-06-06 18:01:04.
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Anticipated Federal Income Tax Rates
Tax Rates in
Anticipated in
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994

Current Year

Next Year

.48
.48
.48
.46
.46
.46
.46
.46
.46
.46
.46
.40
.34
.34
.34
.34
.34
.35
.35

.48
.48
.46
.46
.46
.46
.46
.46
.46
.46
.40
.34
.34
.34
.34
.34
.34
.35
.35

Source: Commerce Clearing House (1996, vol. 1, sec. 3265.0129--.0139).

depend on its particular circumstances as well as the tax law. For the case of a
company that is continually subject to tax at the full tax rate, the variation in
taxes depends on the statute. Statutory corporate tax rates have changed from
time to time. Sometimes tax legislation specifies the future course of tax rates.
For purposes of this exercise, we assume that companies know the tax rate
applicable in the current reporting year and for future years believe the tax
rates specified in legislation as of the end of the current reporting year. Table
7.6 sets out the tax rates used in our calculations for each year. 6
To calculate the net benefit from deferral, we require a discount rate. In table
7.7, we have used the yield, after taxes, on one-year Treasury bonds to determine the addition to the after-tax bottom line in a given year of adding a dollar
to loss reserves (holding future reserves constant). Thus, the tax payoff to
insurers of overstating reserves has generally been a function of prevailing interest rates and of anticipated reductions in tax rates. The overstatement payoffs in 1986 and 1987, for example, were notably high by historical standards
($0.07 and $0.06 per dollar, respectively) owing to the anticipated reduction in
corporate tax rates.
Given the assumptions about insurers' expectations regarding tax rates and
6. Logue (1996) explores the possibility that tax-rate changes may have been anticipated by
insurers before 1986 and so influenced their behavior at an earlier point.

Table 7.7
Reporting
Year
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994

Tax Deferral Gain Due to One Extra Reserve Donar

Discount
Factor

Tax Saving
This Year

Extra Tux
Next Year

LOO

.48
.48
.48
.46
.46
.46
.46
.46
.46
.46
.46
.32
.27
.27
.27
.27
.27
.28
.28

.48
.48
.46
.46
.46
.46
.46
.46
.46
.46
.40
.27
.27
.27
.27
.27
.27
.28
.28

1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
.80
.80
.80
.80
.80
.80
.80
.80

Before-Tux
Interest
Rate

After-Tux
Interest
Rate

Current Value of
Next Year's
Extra Tux

Present-Value Payoff
per Extra Dollar
of Reserves

5.88
6.09
8.34
10.65
12.00
14.80
12.28
9.58
10.91
8.42
6.46
6.77
7.65
8.53
7.89
5.86
3.89
3.41

3.06
3.17
4.50

.47
.47
.44
.43
.43
.43
.43
.44
.43
.44
.39
.26
.26
.26
.26
.26
.27
.27
.28

.01
.01
.04
.03
.03
.03
.03
.02
.03
.02
.07
.06
.01
.01
.01
.01
.01
.01
.00

5.15
6.48
7.99
6.63
5.17
5.89
4.55
3.87
4.47
5.05
5.63
5.21
3.87
2.57
2.22

Source: Interest rates, Federal Reserve Board data, gopher://gopher.town.hall.org/other/fed/h_l5; discount factors as described in Bradford and Logue (1998).
Note: One-year interest rates are the simple arithmetic means of one-year Treasury bond yields during the year. The 1986 row refers to strengthening of past years.
The factor for 1985 ignores the fresh-start rule (see the text). The discount factors after 1986 are the simple average of the 1987 factors for AY + 0 to AY + 10.
(AY = accident year.)

290

David F. Bradford and Kyle D. Logue

interest rates in table 7 .6, the overstatement payoff described in table 7.7 would
apply to any reserving decisions except tlwse affected by the fresh-stan rule.
The fresh start changes the story. For those reserves to which the fresh start was
expected by insurers to apply, the reserve-overstatement payoff was increased
beyond the amounts described in table 7.7. To what reserves might insurers
have plausibly expected the fresh start to apply? TRA86 specifically provides
that the fresh start applies to all property-casualty reserves outstanding as of
the end of 1986, with the following exception: it does not apply to any reserve
strengthening reported in 1986. Thus, for any reserve strengthening made in
1986, the analysis in table 7. 7 would apply. But the analysis is different for
any new policies written in 1986 and (to the extent that companies anticipated
TRA86's introduction of discounted reserves and of the fresh-start rule) any
new policies written in (or strengthening reported in) 1985 or earlier.
Under the fresh-start rule, for example, the present value of one dollar of
reserve overstatement in the 1986 tax year for the 1986 accident year depends
on the line of insurance. This is because the effect of the rule is to offset a
deduction of a dollar in 1986 with an inclusion of the discount factor in 1987.
The discount factor is larger the longer the tail of the insurance in question
(because the payments are more distant in the future). Therefore, the taxreducing value of an extra dollar of reserves is larger for the longer-tailed lines.
Table 7.8 spells out the details. The fresh-start rule substantially increased the
incentive to overstate reserves in 1986 (for policies covering 1986), compared
with the incentives resulting from the declining tax-rate effect taken by itself.
For medical malpractice, for example, an extra dollar of reserves on a new
policy, holding constant the end-of-1987 reserves, was worth the equivalent of
$0.19 in after-tax income in 1986. A comparable incentive applied to reserves
for accident years 1985 and earlier at the end of the 1985 reporting year, to the
extent that the fresh-start rule was anticipated then.
It is easy to become confused about the various tax incentives. To review,
the incentive effect of the change in tax rates applied to all reserves at the end
of 1986 and 1987. Strictly speaking, the rate reductions for 1987 and 1988 did
not imply any extra incentive to add to reserves in 1985 since the same benefit
could be obtained by strengthening reserves in 1986. (If strengthening reserves
is itself costly, for example, if it attracts extra regulatory scrutiny, then the extra
payoff to reserves at the end of 1986 would have an indirect incentive effect on
reserving in 1985 or even earlier.) The incentive effect owing to the fresh-start
rule (combined with the rate-change effect) applied to new reserves established
during 1986 (i.e., to reserves for policies covering accident year 1986). The
fresh-start effect also had a direct effect on the incentive to add to reserves (for
all accident years) at the end of 1985 to the extent that the new tax policy was
anticipated. In this case, the extraordinary tax benefit was the result of carrying
the higher reserves into 1987.
Table 7.9 gives an idea of the magnitudes involved in the fresh-start rule as
it affected losses incurred in 1986. (For a discussion of the predicted effect of

Table 7.8

Line

Ml
AL
WC
OL

MM

Gain from an Extra Dollar of Reserves of New Policies in 1986: The Effect of the Fresh-Start Rule

Discount
Factor
.89
.89
.81
.77
.69

Tux Saving
This Year
.46
.46
.46
.46
.46

Extra Tax
Next Year

Before-Tax
Interest Rate

After-Tux
Interest Rate

Current Value of
Next Year's
Extra Tux

Payoff per
Extra Dollar
of Reserves

.36
.36
.32
.31
.28

6.46
6.46
6.46
6.46
6.46

3.87
3.87
3.87
3.87
3.87

.34
.34
.31
.30
.27

.12
.12
.15
.16
.19

Sources: Interest rates, Federal Reserve Board data, gopher://gopher.town.hall.org/other/fed/h.J5; discount factors as described in Bradford and Logue (1998).
Note: One-year interest rates are the simple arithmetic means of one-year 'Ireasury bond yields. The discount factors are the simple average of the 1987 factors for
AY + 0 to AY + 10. (AY = accident year.)

Table7.9

Losses Incurred in 1986 and Fresh Start (loss reserves for accident year 1986, reported in 1986, amount reported in thousands)

(l)

Premiums
Earned for
AY 1986
(2)

Loss Incurred
inAYl986
Reported in 1986
(3)

Payoff to Extra
Dollar of
Reserves(%)
(4)

Estimated Saving Due
to Fresh-Start Rule
(col. l X col. 4)
(5)

Estimated Saving from
10% Increase in
Incurred-Loss Estimate
(10% of col. 3 x col. 4)
(6)

9,705,812
23,500,447
12,019,927
11,841,432
3,450,089
60,517,707

32,284,313
41,133,219
19,039,001
16,188,897
3,509,158
112,154,588

19,206,091
33,550,013
15,376,597
12,262,955
3,500,588
83,896,244

12
12
15
16
19

1,144,212
2,740,056
1,779,845
1,946,029
671,926
8,282,068

226,419
391,179
227,688
201,530
68,176
1,114,993

Reserves for
AY l986at
Year-End 1986
Line

MI
AL
WC
OL

MM
Total

Source: Authors' calculations based on Best's Aggregates and Averoges (various years).
Note: AY = accident year.
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the fresh-start rule on premiums, assuming no variation in any tax-induced bias
in reported loss reserves, see Bradford and Logue [1998].)
An implication of this analysis of the tax incentives bearing on the reserving
decision is that, apart from 1986 and possibly for strengthening in 1985, the
marginal payoff to an extra dollar of reserves is the same for all lines and
accident years. That is, with the exception of the fresh-start effect, any difference in tax-motivated reserving behavior from line to line or accident year to
accident year must be related to the differences in the regulatory, financial, and
other nontax consequences of variation in the reported loss reserves.

7.4 Reserving Seen in Industry Data
Industry aggregate data are suggestive of behavior consistent with taxinfluenced reserving. Figures 7.1-7.5 attempt to capture the pattern of reserve
strengthening that occurred in the various lines (running from short to long
tailed). The graphs show the ratio of (a) the incurred loss estimate at the end
of each year after the accident year to (b) the estimate at the end of the accident
year (i.e., the first reported figure). All the curves start at one. A rising link in
a curve indicates that the reserve for the given accident year was strengthened
in the reporting year in question. In that sense, it means that the accident-year
reserve was understated in the prior year. A falling link in a curve indicates
reserve weakening for that accident year in the reporting year in question. In
that sense, it means that the accident-year reserve was overstated in the prior
year. The augmented tax incentive to bias reserves would imply, for pre-1985
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Incurred-loss estimates by years since accident year: MI

Source: Authors' calculations based on data from Best's Aggregates and Averages (various years).
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accident years, rising links corresponding to reporting years 1985 and later.
For the 1986 and 1987 accident years, and for 1985 to the extent that the restriction on the fresh-start rule was anticipated, one would expect that a tax induced overstatement of initial reported losses incurred, followed by subsequent reserve weakening (downward links) as the policies matured toward their
ultimate payout. For accident years 1988 and later, one might expect a reversion to something like the pattern of earlier years.
Since the incurred losses are subject to considerable uncertainty, it is not
possible to draw conclusions from the industry data with great confidence. The
pictures, however, appear broadly consistent with the description just given. In
the 1986 accident year, especially in the long-tailed lines (see figs. 7.4 and 7.5),
there is a substantial shift in the downward direction in the curves-suggesting
overstatement of the initial 1986 reserves that subsequently required weakening. Note also the 1985 accident year for the long-tailed lines. That is the first
accident year to show a substantial change in reserving direction; that is, although the 1985 reserves ultimately had to be strengthened, they had to be
strengthened by considerably less than the 1984 accident-year reserves. Until
1985, the degree of strengthening in the long-tailed lines had been increasing
for several years.
The picture after 1987 is less obviously consistent with our hypothesis. We
would have expected the reserves in those years, when the tax incentive was
no longer so strong, to return to the pre-1986 patterns. But that did not happen.
The post-1987 accident-year reserves were, like the 1986 reserve, initially
overstated (thus the downward character in the curves). There is no obvious
tax-related explanation for this trend. For some reason, over the course of one
or two years, the property-casualty insurance industry became more conservative in its reserving decisions, and, what is difficult to explain (at least from a
tax-avoidance perspective), the change in this tendency stuck. One possible
explanation is that, putting aside the temporary tax incentive to overstate reserves created by the fresh-start rule, there was generally a greater incentive to
overstate reserves after TRA86 than before simply because, after the act,
property-casualty insurers had more taxable income. That is, before the act,
because of the undiscounted reserving, among other things, the insurance industry in the aggregate had relatively little taxable income anyway, whereas,
after the act, the industry had considerably more income that was potentially
taxable. 7 Another possibility, of course, is that-for reasons unrelated to
taxes-insurers became more conservative in their estimates of loss reserves.
Table 7 .10 attempts to capture the extent of conservatism in the initial
incurred-loss report in the form of the ratio of the report five years later to the
initial report. So, for example, according to the table, the incurred loss figure
for automobile liability for accident year 1985 was up by 7 percent at the end of
1990, relative to the initially announced level. Relatively high numbers mean
7. For further discussion of this possibility, see Logue (19%).
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Incurred-Loss Estimates Five Years Out (summary: ratio of losses,
report 5 to report 1)

Table 7.10

Accident
Year
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990

MI

AL

we

OL

MM

.88
.97
1.05

.98
1.01
1.01
1.04
1.07
1.07
1.02
.99
.98
.98
.95

.88
.94
1.00
1.06
1.14
1.13
1.07
1.04
1.07
1.08
1.09

.99
1.12
1.24
1.36
1.38
1.16
.87
.81
.85
.90
1.00

1.18
1.39
1.40
1.41
1.27
1.21
.86
.85
.83
.79
.81

I.II
1.08
1.05
.96
.98
.98
1.03
.99

Source: Authors' calculations based on data from Best's Aggregates and Averages (various years).
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19118
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Loss estimates five years out: ratio to initial estimates

Source: Authors' calculations based on data from Best's Aggregates and Averages (various years).

relatively low initial reserves. Particularly for the long-tailed lines, there appears to be a break at 1986. Figure 7.6 displays the same information graphically.
Table 7 .11 presents data on the extent of reserve strengthening (relating to
past accident years) in reporting years 1983-94. Each cell reports, for that reporting year, the average over the five most recent accident years of the ratio of

Average Year-to-Year Increase in Incurred-Loss Reports, Reporting Years 1983-94

Table 7.11
Line

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

MI

.02
-.01
-.05
.01
.03

.12
.00
.00
.08

.13
.05
.01

.09

.08
.02

.04

.11

.04
.10

.06

.00

.05

.26
.II

.08
.06

.04
.01
.03
.03
.08

AL
WC

OL
MM
Average

.01

.04
.09
.02
.05

.01
.06

.04
.02
.03

.04

1990

1991

.00
.00

.00
-.01
.06
-.03
-.08

.04
.00
-.08
-.01

-.01

1992

1993

1994

.00

-.01

-.04

-.04

-.05
-.05
.05
.08

.05
-.05
-.05
-.02

.00

-.04
-.08
-.03

-.09
-.01

Source: Authors' calculations based on data from Best's Aggregates and Averages (various years).
Note: Cells show average for the five most recent accident years of the fractional increase in the sum of paid and unpaid losses. (For 1983, three accident years are
included and, for 1984, four accident years.)
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the increase in the total incurred loss estimate (i.e., the sum of paid and unpaid
losses) to its previous level. (Because the data extend back only to 1980, for
1983 three past years are accounted for, and for 1984 four past years are accounted for.) Finally, we have noted that the incentive to strengthen reserves
on past accident years was strongest in 1985 to the extent that the fresh-start
rule was anticipated. Otherwise, the incentive effects of the tax-rate changes
from 1985 to 1986 and from 1986 to 1987 reflected in table 7.7 above apply.
The bottom line of the table presents the simple averages of the averages. Here,
one sees a pattern generally consistent with the influence of the tax incentives,
including something of a reversion to roughly zero strengthening in the more
recent years.

7.5

Concluding Comments

In this paper, we have explained how the federal income tax rules, and especially changes in those rules, have combined with financial market circumstances (interest rates) to create incentives bearing on property-casualty insurers' decisions regarding the level of loss reserves to report. We find that these
incentives have varied substantially over time. In particular, transition effects
due to the Tax Reform Act of 1986 created unusually large incentives to overstate reserves in reporting years 1985-87. We would emphasize that, because
they amount to forecasts of quite variable quantities, reserves are inevitably
subject to correction over time. Furthermore, taxes are not the only sources of
biasing incentives that may vary from time to time. Still, the picture in aggregate industry data that we have assembled is broadly consistent with the taxmotivated reserving hypothesis. In work in progress, we hope to tease additional insights about reserving from the quantitative record.
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Comment

Ross J. Davidson Jr.

When Ken Froot asked me to discuss this paper, I was quick to remind him
that I am neither a reserving actuary nor a tax expert. He was either desperate
for another discussant or thought that my involvement in capital management,
financial exposure management, and insurance regulatory capital issues over
the past few years could add a unique perspective to this topic.
But I must admit to an agenda in agreeing to discuss this paper. I am currently coordinating the Technical Advisory Group to the National Association
of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) Catastrophe Reserve Subgroup. This
group is composed of approximately forty individuals who represent insurers,
insurance brokers, catastrophe-modeling firms, investment banks, accounting,
legal, and actuarial firms, and federal government agencies. They are a collection of very talented people, with broadly ranging expertise in actuarial science, tax, accounting, economics, capital markets, and state and federal regulatory affairs. We are charged with advising a group of state regulatory officials
who represent the NAIC on the rationale, appropriate design, economic effects, and implementation of a reserve for future catastrophes. Annual additions to this reserve would be deductible for federal tax purposes, and drawdowns against the reserve would flow into taxable income, allowing smoothing
of insurer results. Since this reserve is intended to provide insurers with incentives to write catastrophe coverage in hazard-prone areas while improving the
financial strength of such insurers, I have more than a casual interest in any
study that seeks to gauge the effect of changes in tax law on insurance reserving practices. The question is, Will the desired market and capital retention
behavior be induced by tax incentives? Alternatively, if a reserve is mandated;
can it be designed to be an efficient mechanism?
In fact, before I read Bradford and Logue's paper, I expected that it might
be an answer to my prayers. The fundamental premise that income tax rules
could influence reserving practices is closely related to the premise that reserving requirements that include tax incentives could influence an insurer's decisions to write hazard insurance. In fact, the very techniques by which Bradford
Ross Davidson is vice president of industry affairs at the United Services Automobile Association in San Antonio, Texas.
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and Logue sought to ferret out past behaviors induced by tax-law changes
could forrn the basis of predictive behavior models that could help shape and
direct the debate on reserving practices that include tax incentives. What's
more, maybe after our discussion more of you will want to develop a method
to predict the influences on market behavior and financial strength of taxdeductible catastrophe reserves. As we have seen, Howard Kunreuther and the
Wharton school are beginning to build some of the infrastructure models for
such a project.
Now, more to the topic of the paper, I will not seek to comment on the
elegance of the formulas or the correctness of the statistical analysis or even
the authors' attempts to deal with imperfections in or paucity of the data, but I
will attempt to address the relevance of the paper and its conclusions to insurance management and regulation and will point out some dimensions of the
paper that, if broadened, might be useful to practitioners.
Occasionally, I look at the last page of a book before I begin reading it. This
has the risk of being like eating dessert first. It can stimulate the taste buds, but
the rest of the meal may seem somewhat pedestrian. But I must say that, when
I read the conclusion of this paper first, I did not have that experience. In fact,
I found the reading of the paper, the main course if you will, to be far more
satisfying than the conclusion (the hoped-for dessert). Remember the feeling
you get when you're engrossed in an intense television program (maybe your
favorite soap or "Star Trek" mutant) that seems to be approaching the climatic
scene, only to see to be continued appear on the screen. I relived that feeling as
I read the conclusion of this paper. To paraphrase, while from an industrywide
perspective some tax-induced reserving behavior can be detected, other influences may in fact be causing the observed behavior. Moreover, the jury is still
out on how to adequately measure the tax-incentive-influenced behavior of industry sectors or individual insurers with different tax characteristics. Admittedly, this is a very complicated subject that must be simplified. However, any
tax-motivated behavior must be evaluated in balance with other important nontax factors that influence management decisions. As the authors continue their
exploration, I encourage them to evaluate the influence and correlation of some
of the following factors on past and future reserving behavior.
Effect of Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT)

This change in the tax law had a profound effect on property and casualty
insurers and may even have modulated any reserving behavior influenced by tax
incentives. Before AMT, varying the mix of taxable and tax-exempt investment
income was a dominant tax-minimization strategy. After AMT, property and
casualty insurers could no longer use investment mix as a dominant tool to minimize taxable income. With the AMT, many property-casualty insurers became
taxpayers for the first time, and, having their options limited, they may have
looked more carefully at reserving practices to modulate their taxable income.
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The Uncertainty Factor

As I collected comments on the paper from USAA's reserving actuary, she
reminded me that her job is not all science. A significant amount of uncertainty
is involved in reserve estimation, especially for the long tail lines that seem to
have demonstrated some evidence of change in the target period. New developments in cost and litigation can often dramatically change perceptions and give
the impression that someone may have been cooking the books when in fact
more information had led to a different expectation of loss development.
Changes in development of claims on other liability, especially environmental and asbestos claims during the 1980s, are a good example. Around the same
time as the 1986 tax act, there were dramatic changes in the perception of insurers writing these coverages as to the development of claims. Many insurers
were adding massive amounts to their reserves as the specter of increased costs
of litigation and recovery loomed. Another example is the effect on medical
malpractice claims of recent lower health care costs and a trend to a less litigious environment.
The Effect of the Competitive Cycle and Interest Rates
and Inflation on Underwriting

The early to mid-1980s were years of dramatic change in interest rates and
inflation, both of which greatly affect profitability. The transition out of high
inflation and interest rates to lower rates caused many insurers to reevaluate
the role of underwriting results in the profitability equation. If insurers were
prone to use the underwriting component to smooth earnings, they would have
found the mid-1980s to be an especially tempting time to do so.
The Limited Opportunity for Undetected Reserve Manipulation in
Short-Tail Lines like Automobile Liability, Homeowner's, and Marine

Because of their relatively short development life cycle, these lines may not
have allowed for enough flexibility for undetected tax-incentive-influenced reserving variations. Longer tail lines do, owing to the sheer larger number of
years that it takes you or others to know if you were wrong.
The Complex and Dynamic Regulatory Scene

Regulators use many more tools than the premium-to-surplus ratio to determine the financial health of their regulated companies. In fact, they look carefully at the development of reserves, believing that most insurers are habitually
underreserved. The fact that an insurer strengthened reserves may play more
heavily on a regulator's view of the financial strength of an insurer than is
credited by the authors. The NAIC has a couple of sets of ratios, some of
which more directly go to the point of reserve adequacy. Financial hazardous
condition laws use the so-called ratios to provide regulators with the authority

303

The Influence of Income Tax Rules on Insurance Reserves

to intervene in a company's management if negative trends develop in income,
surplus, liabilities, etc.
More recently, the advent of risk-based capital has become more important
than the surplus liquidity ratio, although its effect may be relatively similar to
the premium-to-surplus ratio.
Rating Agency and Stock Analysts' Perceptions
Are Not Exclusively Based on Earnings

Like regulators, rating agencies and stock analysts are just as interested and
were maybe uniformly more sophisticated in the 1980s in assessing the adequacy of reserves in the capital sufficiency equation.
While the authors note in their conclusion that the measures they explored
and the data set that they used did not lend themselves well to effective insector analysis, nonetheless there are fairly significant differences in how segments of the property-casualty industry might behave. Some of those include
the following:
Stock and Nonstock Insurers. Insurers organized as stockholder-held entities
are driven by different motives. They seek to please Wall Street, are more inclined to shorter-term tactical decisions, and may view reported earnings with
a higher priority than nonstocks. Having worked for both types of organizations in my career, I can testify to the vast difference.
Capital Rich and Capital Poor Insurers. This can be a major motivator since
those insurers that may be perceived as having too much capital will tend to
try to reserve robustly and be less sensitive to tax-law changes.
Large and Small Insurers. Some insurers write only in one state and as a result
are not affected as much by national insurance regulatory schemes such as
the NAIC.
Another effect to be considered is the dominance of one or a few insurers in
the data. In industry studies, we have found that State Farm and several other
insurers dominate the outcome of any industry trends. Techniques to normalize
for size of insurers seem to yield vastly different results.
Back to "As the World Turns"

I believe that the exploration done here may form the basis of very important
research as the national debate on catastrophe management begins to consider
tax-incentive-influenced reserving for catastrophes. The foundation of that effort is that tax incentives will produce behavior on the part of insurers and
other capital providers that will help deal with solvency and availability issues
in the hazard-insurance market.
Several points may give us perspective on this issue. While catastrophe risk
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can be managed in a number of ways, the bottom line is that the capital to
cover these risks must come from somewhere-ultimately either current or
future policyholders (the primary risk takers) or current or future taxpayers.
Tax policy can either support or work against appropriate accumulation and
allocation of that capital. The current taxation of profits or losses from catastrophe coverage works against the optimal allocation of capital. Even the carryback and carryforward rules intended to allow for temporal variation of results
are inadequate to deal with the time frames that we encounter in managing
exposures to megacatastrophes. Catastrophe reserves must fit into the overall framework of capital for catastrophe-management tools. A good balance
must be struck with other capital resources.
One implication of these points is that tax policy must be used very carefully
when attempting to modify capital accumulation and allocation behavior.
If the techniques explored in this paper for ferreting out tax-motivated historical behavior can be refined and applied prospectively to predict future taxincentive-influenced behavior, the nation will have been well served in the upcoming debate on tax-deductible catastrophe reserves. I hope that the script
of the next episode in this to-be-continued development will address these issues. I also hope that many of you will be similarly inspired to explore this
new and exciting frontier. It may help us practitioners carry the catastrophemanagement ball a little farther down the field.

Comment

James R. Hines Jr.

This paper offers a very readable description of the U.S. tax treatment of insurance loss reserves, which is a significant accomplishment, and goes on to analyze the industry's reactions to the incentives introduced by the Tax Reform
Act of 1986. The evidence is consistent with an important effect of tax incentives on loss-reserve accounting, although the available data are so limited that
it is difficult to measure precisely the magnitude of the effect. Nevertheless,
the notion that insurers adjust their loss reserves in response to changes in tax
incentives is consistent with other well-documented aspects of firm behavior
and is of sufficient importance to be worthy of careful investigation.
The nature of the insurance industry makes income measurement particularly challenging, which in tum makes the taxation of its income a very difficult exercise. The arcane and somewhat arbitrary tax rules that Bradford and
Logue describe are required in order to implement a system that attempts to
tax the annual flow of income in a line of business in which one year's activities
James R. Hines Jr. is associate professor of business economics and public policy at the University of Michigan Business School and a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
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generate a stream of future liabilities the present value of which is highly uncertain. Since the 1977 publication of Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform, David
Bradford has been a leading proponent of replacing the income tax with a consumption tax, maintaining that the consumption tax is not only more efficient
than an income tax but also easier to administer. Bradford's recent work includes careful descriptions of various complex parts of the Internal Revenue
Code that are always to the point but that also always subtly remind the reader
of the tangled web that an income tax represents (see, e.g., Bradford 1986; and
Ault and Bradford 1990). This paper falls squarely in that tradition.
It is instructive to consider the incentives facing those in the insurance industry who select loss-reserve levels for their firms. Firms generally have tax incentives to overstate their loss reserves even in the absence oflegislative transitions such as those introduced by the 1986 act. Increasing reserves reduces
present taxable income by the same amount that it increases future taxable
income. This is a profitable exercise as long as there is a positive time value to
money. The uniformly positive numbers that appear in the rightmost column
of Bradford and Logue's table 7.7 in part reflect this incentive. In an extreme
case, a firm with carte blanche to select its loss reserve level can, by increasing
the loss reserve sufficiently each year, reduce to zero its tax liability in every
period.
What prevents taxable firms from greatly increasing their loss-reserve levels
and enjoying the accompanying tax benefits? It is probably the case that several
considerations conspire to prevent them from doing so. The first of these is
oversight by the Internal Revenue Service, which can disallow unwarranted
deductions and which can make life unpleasant for taxpayers deemed to have
taken unwarranted deductions. The second is oversight by shareholders and
bondholders, who may have difficulty distinguishing tax-motivated reserve increases from those that reflect true economic risks to the firm. As a result, share
values, bond ratings, and managerial compensation may fall in reaction to announcements of higher loss-reserve levels. The third is oversight by state regulators, who are concerned about the relative magnitudes of assets and liabilities
and who may also interpret higher loss-reserve levels as reflecting greater liabilities. The fourth consideration is professional custom and other human habits that prevent firms from optimizing on all margins all the time.
Consequently, the responsiveness of reserve levels to tax changes appears
against a background in which firms do not fully optimize against the tax system owing to one or more nontax frictions. The inability or unwillingness of
insurers to adjust their reserve levels to minimize tax liabilities is analogous to
widely observed behavior in which firms fail to take full advantage of their
opportunities to overstate their expenses or understate their incomes in order
to reduce tax liabilities. One example is the choice of inventory-accounting
method. In the presence of any amount of inflation, firms reduce their tax liabilities by substituting last-in, first-out for first-in, first-out inventory accounting. In spite of this incentive, a significant number of firms persist in using
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first-in, first-out accounting. A second example concerns the choice of depreciation method for tax purposes. Accelerated depreciation schedules, when available, generally enhance the present value of depreciation allowances-but, in
spite of this advantage, they are not universally employed. The case of depreciation allowances is all the more thought provoking in that there is no requirement (as there is in the case of inventory accounting and loss-reserve
accounting) that the same methods must be used for both tax calculations and
financial statements.
In spite of the likely presence of nontax frictions, the loss-reserve behavior
documented by Bradford and Logue is broadly consistent with the tax incentives introduced by the 1986 act. Loss reserves rise at the same time that incentives to overstate them rise, doing so most visibly in the long-tailed lines of
business in which one would expect to see the strongest reaction. It is, however,
impossible to draw any strong statistical inferences from the behavior of a
sample of just five lines of business around one event date (1986). Furthermore, the changing legal environment of the mid-1980s that was responsible
for rising liability awards may itself have encouraged insurers to expand their
loss reserves in a way that could appear to have been tax motivated. While
the evidence is highly suggestive of tax-motivated behavior, it simultaneously
reflects all other secular changes that influence insurance reserves.
Part of the attraction of studying the industry's reaction to events around
1986 is that doing so affords insight into the extent to which tax and nontax
considerations influence reserve levels during unspectacular periods. A finding
that reserve levels respond dramatically to tax changes in tum suggests that
reserves are significantly overstated on a chronic basis owing to the tax incentive that arises from discounting. Since the paper in fact reports evidence that
reserves react significantly to tax transitions, it follows that reserves in normal
years typically overstate expected future liabilities. This inference in tum carries any number of implications for tax and regulatory policy as well as implications for the way in which financial markets should react to announcements
of changes in loss reserves. So there is quite a bit of interesting work to be
done in addition to this very useful analysis of reactions to the Tax Reform Act
of 1986.
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